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Abstract
In this paper we consider IL0, the closed fragment of the basic inter-
pretability logic IL. We show that we can translate GL1, the one variable
fragment of Go¨del-Lo¨b’s provabilty logic GL, into IL0. Invoking a result
on the PSPACE completeness of GL1 we obtain the PSPACE hardness
of IL0.
1 Introduction
For a propositional logic L, the closed fragment –we write L0– of that logic
consists of those theorems of L that do not contain any propositional variables
at all. For various logics, it is known that the closed fragment is a lot easier
than the full logic itself. The simplicity of the closed fragment can be captured
by the complexity class of a decision procedure of theoremhood. Moreover, in
all cases where L0 is known to be simpler than L in this sense, we have a set of
normal forms for L0 and a normal form theorem to the effect that each closed
formula can be written in a unique way as a special combination of normal form
formulas.
Perhaps the most canonical example of this phenomenon is classical proposi-
tional logic. Theoremhood in classical propositional logic is known to be co-NP
complete whereas the closed fragment is decidable in LOG-time. In this case,
by definition, the only two formulas in normal form are ⊤ and ⊥. For various
modal logics the situation is similar but slightly different. For the provabil-
ity logic GL, theoremhood is known to be a PSPACE complete problem (see
[2, Theorem 18.29]), whereas provability of formulas in the closed fragment is
known to be PTIME decidable (see [3, Theorem 9]). Moreover, the normal
form theorem ([1, Chapter 7]) states that each formula in the closed fragment
is provably equivalent to a Boolean combination of formulas of the form n⊥
with n ∈ ω.
Interpretability logics arise as natural extensions of GL. The logic GL has
only one modal operator A to capture that “A is provable in some basic theory
T ”. Interpretability logics have an additional binary modality A⊲B to capture
that “the theory T +A interprets the theory T +B”.
These interpretability logics are always defined as some core part IL as
defined below, together with some additional principles. However, as soon as the
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additional principles prove some rather weak principle F, the technical details of
which are irrelevant for the moment, then closed interpretability formulas can be
expressed without the modality ⊲ and the normal forms are the same as those
of GL: Boolean combination of formulas of the form n⊥ with n ∈ ω (see [5]).
It is good to stress here that all interpretability logics with some interesting
meta-mathematical content do contain the principle F. For logics below ILF
and in particular for IL itself, it is not known if there exists a natural set of
normal forms.
Not for all modal logics it is the case that the L0 is simpler than L. In
particular, it is known that the minimal modal logic K and its closed fragment
K0 are both PSPACE complete (see [3, Corollary 4]). The same also happens
for the modal logic K4 of transitive frames (see also [3]).
We shall see in this paper that the logic IL is like these logics K and K4 in
that also the closed fragment of IL is PSPACE hard thereby settling an open
question in [8] in the negative as to whether the closed fragment allows a nice
characterization.
2 Interpretability logics
Interpretability logics have been primarily used to study in a formalized setting
the notion of relativized interpretability which is captured by a binary modal
operator ⊲. The phrase p⊲ q is to be read as “(T together with the translation
of p) interprets (T together with the translation of q)” for some base theory
T . Different theories T prove different modal principles to hold. However, all
theories that allow for coding of syntax and thus for formalizing the notion of
interpretability do validate some core logic which is called IL.
2.1 The logic IL
We recall that GL is the normal modal logic with one modality  whose non-
logical axioms are instantiations of the following axiom schemes.
1. (A→ B)→ (A→ B)
2. (A→ A)→ A
It is well known that GL proves the transitivity axiom, that is,
A→ A.
The logic IL is formulated in a propositional modal logic with two modalities 
and ⊲. We shall use the following reading conventions. The strongest binding
operators are ¬ and  followed by ∨ and ∧ which in turn bind stronger than
⊲. The weakest binding connectives are the implications ↔ and →. We shall
write ♦ϕ as shorthand for ¬¬ϕ.
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Definition 2.1. The logic IL is a normal modal logic containing GL whose
rules are Modus Ponens and Necessitation and whose axioms other than all
propositional tautologies are the instances of the following axiom schemes.
J1 (A→ B)→ A⊲B
J2 (A⊲B) ∧ (B ⊲ C)→ A⊲ C
J3 (A⊲ C) ∧ (B ⊲ C)→ A ∨B ⊲ C
J4 A⊲ B → (♦A→ ♦B)
J5 ♦A⊲A
It follows from J1 and J4 that  is expressible in terms of ⊲ within IL:
IL ⊢ A↔ ¬A⊲⊥.
The logic ILF is obtained by adding the axiom F to IL.
F := ♦A→ ¬(A ⊲ ♦A)
This principle can be seen as a natural generalization of Go¨del’s second in-
completeness theorem. Go¨del’s second incompleteness theorem states that any
recursive theory, whenever consistent, does not prove its own consistency. The
principle F states that any recursive theory, whenever consistent, does not even
interpret its own consistency.
2.2 Semantics for IL
The logic IL allows for natural Kripke semantics where the binary modality ⊲
is modeled by a ternary relation. Rather than working with a ternary relation,
we tend to conceive the semantics for ⊲ as a collection of binary relations.
Definition 2.2. An IL model, also called Veltman-model, is a quadruple
〈W,R, {Sx : x ∈ W},〉 where W is a non-empty set of worlds, R is a bi-
nary relation on W that is transitive and conversely well-founded. For each
x ∈ W , the binary relation Sx is transitive and reflexive such that moreover
1. ySxz → xRy ∧ xRz;
2. xRyRz → ySxz.
The relation  is a usual forcing relation that can be conceived as a map as-
signing to each propositional variable p a subset v(p) of W of the worlds where
p holds. We write x  p to indicate that x ∈ v(p). The relation  is extended
to the set of all formulae by stipulating that
1. x  A ⇔ ∀y (xRy → y  A);
2. x  A⊲B ⇔ ∀y(xRy ∧ y  A→ ∃z(ySxz ∧ z  B)).
It is well-known that IL is sound and complete with respect to the class of
all Veltman models (see [4]).
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2.3 Fragments
We shall denote by IL0 the fragment of IL that consists of those modal formulae
provable in IL that contain no propositional variables. Likewise, by GL1 we
shall denote those formulas in the language ofGL that contain only one variable
and are theorems of GL.
3 Translating GL1 into IL0
Let p be the variable of GL1. We shall translate this variable to some formula
in the closed fragment of IL that essentially uses the ⊲ modality. It is easy to
see that such formulas exist. Examples are given in [8] (Section 5.4) and in [7].
The formula that we use here is equal to the one exposed in [7].
3.1 Some motivation for our translation
In this section we shall expose a translation that reduces theoremhood of GL1
to IL0 thereby establishing PSPACE hardness of the latter. The motivation for
this translation is mainly semantical.
We will code the information as to whether p holds or not in a world x by
making the formula ⊤⊲♦⊤ true at x if and only if x  p. To this extent we can
glue to each x two new worlds x1 and x2 with xRx1Rx2 and
1 x2Sxx1 ⇔ x  p.
For this, all the Sx relations in IL are sufficiently independent. This idea should
motivate why we translate p to ♦♦⊤ → ⊤⊲ ♦⊤.
Moreover, with this approach the points that we are interested in, that is,
the original points, become easily definable by the formula ♦♦⊤. Thus, when
quantifying over points that we are interested in, we should relativize to our old
domain. This explains why we shall translate A to (♦♦⊤ → A†) where A†
is the translation of A.
We shall see in Subsection 3.3 that we do not actually need to glue so many
different new worlds to code all the behavior of the x ⊢ p for all x in the model.
By transitivity it suffices to add some worlds only at the top of the model.
3.2 The translation
We consider the following translation † of formulas of GL1 into formulas of IL0:
1. ⊥† = ⊥
2. p† = ♦♦⊤ → (⊤⊲ ♦⊤)
3. (A→ B)† = A† → B†
4. (A)† = (♦♦⊤ → A†)
1We should add some more Sx relations too on the already existing part of the model. For
the motivational part here, we just focus on the newly added worlds x1 and x2.
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Lemma 3.1. Let A be a formula of GL that only contains the propositional
variable p. If GL ⊢ A, then IL ⊢ A†.
Proof. So, suppose IL 6⊢ A†. Then, there is an IL model M = 〈W,R, {Sx : x ∈
W},〉 and a world w ∈ W such that M, w 6 A†. Next, we consider the GL
model N = 〈W ′, R′,′〉 defined by:
1. W ′ := {w} ∪ {x ∈ W :M, x  ♦♦⊤},
2. R′ := R ∩ (W ′ ×W ′),
3. x ′ p iff M, x  p† (for every x ∈W ′).
We point out that the union defining W ′ may be a non-disjoint one. Using
the definition of N it is straightforward to prove (by induction on the length
of the formula) that for every formula B which only contains the propositional
variable p,
N , x ′ B iff M, x  B† (for every x ∈ W ′).
In particular, we get that N , w 6′ A. Therefore, GL 6⊢ A.
Lemma 3.1 is the easier direction of what we shall see is an equivalence. In
particular, the lemma allows for an easy proof-theoretic proof.
Proof. So, suppose GL ⊢ A. We know that GL has a cut-free proof pi (see
system G1 in [6]) which thus satisfies the sub-formula property. Consequently,
each sequent in pi contains at most the variable p. It is an easy check that proofs
only containing p are preserved under †.
3.3 Construction on models
In this subsection we shall prove the converse to Lemma 3.1.
Lemma 3.2. Let A be a formula of GL that only contains the propositional
variable p. If IL ⊢ A†, then GL ⊢ A.
Proof. By the completeness proofs of IL and GL we know that it is sufficient
to show that
∀A [∀IL-modelM M |= A† =⇒ ∀GL-modelN N |= A],
or equivalently
∀A [∃GL-modelN ∃n∈N N , n  A =⇒ ∃IL-modelM∃m∈M M,m  A†].
To this extent we shall exhibit a transformation on GL models that yields the
desired IL model. Let N := 〈W,R,〉 be a GL-model for some GL-formula A
at most containing the variable p. As GL is complete with respect to finite tree-
like models we may indeed assume that N has is such a finite tree-like model.
By E={e1, . . . , el} we denote the set of end-points in N , which is of course finite.
We consider two disjoint copies of E (which are also disjoint with W ), namely
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E♭ = {e♭
1
, . . . , e♭l} and E
♮ = {e♮
1
, . . . , e
♮
l}. The idea is to ‘glue’ these additional
points e♭i and e
♮
i as a little R chain of length two above
2 the end-points ei so
that each old point in the model will satisfy ♦♦⊤.
As R is conversely well-founded it is the case that each x ∈M is R=-below
some ei (here xR
=y is a shorthand for “xRy ∨ x = y”).
Now, we consider an IL model M = 〈W ′, R′, {S′x : x ∈ W
′}〉 satisfying:
1. W ′ :=W ⊎E♭ ⊎ E♮,
2. R′ is the transitive closure of R ∪ {(e, e♭) : e ∈ E} ∪ {(e♭, e♮) : e ∈ E},
3. S′
e♭
= {(e♮, e♮)} (for every e♭ ∈ E♭).
4. S′e♮ = ∅ (for every e
♮ ∈ E♮).
5. for every x ∈ W it holds that
S′x is the smallest transitive and reflexive relation on {y | xR
′y} that
contains both Sx and R
′ restricted to {y | xR′y} such that moreover for
every e ∈ E,
(e♮, e♭) ∈ S′x iff N , x  p and xR
=e.
It is very easy to check that there is a unique IL model satisfying these con-
ditions. We notice that in the definition of W ′ we have used the symbol ⊎
to emphasize that these unions are indeed disjoint ones, and we have not in-
troduced a valuation ′ in M because our purpose is only to evaluate closed
formulas (like A†).
First of all we note that in M we can modally define the old points in N
since {x ∈ W ′ : M, x  ♦♦⊤} = W . The next step is to prove that for every
formula B which only contains the propositional variable p,
N , x ′ B iff M, x  B† (for every x ∈W ).
The proof of this claim proceeds by an induction on the length of B.
• For ⊤ or ⊥ the claim is vacuous.
• If B = p we have that p† = ♦♦⊤ → ⊤ ⊲ ♦⊤. By construction, M, x 
♦♦⊤. By construction, in any R-successor of x one can go by an Sx
transition to some e♭i where ♦⊤ holds. Thus, indeed, M, x  ⊤⊲ ♦⊤.
• On the other hand, if N , x  ¬p, then againM, x  ♦♦⊤. But in this case
we can go via an R-transition to some e♮i . By construction there is no Sx-
transition from e♮i to any point where ♦⊤ holds, whence M, x 6 ⊤⊲♦⊤.
• The proof of the claim is trivial for both the Boolean connectives and the
modal operator .
Now that the claim is established the lemma follows immediately.
2W.r.t. the R-relation of course.
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4 Computational complexity of IL0
First we obtain PSPACE hardness of IL.
4.1 PSPACE hardness
If we combine Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2 we see that we have a reduction of
GL1 to IL0. That is, for any formula A with at most one variable p we have
that
GL ⊢ A ⇔ IL ⊢ A†.
As it is known that GL1 is PSPACE complete (see [3, Theorem 7] and [9]) we
obtain the main result of this paper.
Theorem 4.1. The computational complexity of IL0 is PSPACE hard.
If in addition to this we would know that IL is in PSPACE we would obtain
PSPACE completeness. It is commonly held that indeed the complexity of full
IL is PSPACE-compleet, but up to now nobody has yet proven this. It came
as a bit of a surprise to the authors to find out that actually no complexity
results in the field of interpretability logics are known. Thus, this short note
could well be the precursor to further investigations in various interpretability
logics on very natural complexity questions in the otherwise mature field of
interpretability logic.
4.2 On a normal form theorem for IL0
The PSPACE completeness of IL0 does a-priori not exclude the possibility of
a normal form theorem of IL. It is even conceivable that there exists some
easily recognizable class of normal forms for IL0 so that each formula in the
language of IL0 is equivalent to a small sized boolean combination of these
normal forms. In such a case the normal forms themselves may be easy and
even easily comparable but then for an arbitrary formula it still remains hard
(PSPACE) to see actually what combination of normal forms it is provably
equivalent to. These observations render a normal form theorem for IL0 –if it
would exist– useless for most practical purposes.
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